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The Supreme Court of the United States will soon have to construe
Article V of the federal Constitution, prescribing the method of
adopting amendments to that instrument. First it will have to clear
up doubt as to when the Eighteenth Amendment was adopted. The
Ohio legislature ratified it, and then on referendum it was disapproved
by the electors of Ohio. The Secretary of State of the United States
proclaimed the Amendment when Ohio ratified it. If the referendum
defeated the ratification by Ohio, then the date of its going into effect
is postponed until some state acting thereafter ratified it. This date
is important by reference to it in criminal and other statutes.
Again the Ohio Legislature ratified the woman suffrage amendment,
but a petition for its referendum to the electors under the Ohio con-
stitution has been filed and the election cannot be had until the general
election in November next. Thirty-five states have ratified the suffrage
amendment, including Ohio. If the Louisiana legislature, which is
to consider the amendment in this month of May, or that of any other
state, ratifies, then the Amendment will be adopted by the requisite
thirty-six states, unless the pending referendum in Ohio prevents the
action of the Ohio legislature from being a valid ratification until
sustained by a popular vote. It is possible, therefore, that the question
whether women will vote at the next Presidential election will turn
on the view the Court takes of Article V. Can ratification of a state
under it be made by a state constitution to depend on the result of a
referendum to the voters of the state? This is the question.
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It reads as follows:
"The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Con-
stitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year
One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the
first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate."
The precise question is whether the word, "Legislatures," as
used in this article, means the law-making powers of the states, or
whether it means the representative political bodies called "Legis-
latures." Such authorities as there are upon this point are not in
accord.
In State ex rel. Mullen v. Howell, Secretary of State,' the issue
arose on a petition for mandamus against the Secretary of State of
Washington to compel him to receive and file a petition for a
referendum to the electors of the state of the resolution of the Wash-
ington legislature ratifying the Eighteenth Amendment. The court
held by a vote of six to three that the provision in the state constitu-
ion for a referendum of all acts, bills, or laws, passed by the legis-
lature of the states subjected the resolution of ratification to a
referendum, on the ground that the word "Legislatures" under
Article V meant and included the law-making or legislative power
of the states.
In Hawke v. Smith, Secretary of State,2 the Supreme Court of Ohio,
with one dissenting judge, sustained a refusal of the lower court to
enjoin the Secretary of State from submitting a referendum on a
legislative resolution of ratification of the same amendment on the
same ground as that taken by the Washington court. In Ohio the
electors voted against ratification. In this case, the Constitution of
Ohio specifically provided that resolutions ratifying amendments to
the federal Constitution should, on the filing of a proper petition, be
submitted to the electors.
In Herbring v. Brown, Attorney General,3 the same question arose
in Oregon, but the provision for a referendum under the state con-
stitution was held not to include joint resolutions of the kind, and the
federal question was not decided.
On the other hand, in Ex parte Dillol,
4 the petitioner for a writ of
(1919, Wash.) 181 Pac. 92o.
'(1919, Ohio) 126 N. E. 400.
'(1919, Ore.) i8o Pac. 328.
'(192o, N. D. Calif.) 262 Fed. 563.
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habeas corpus, in custody for violation of a section of the National
Prohibition Act which by its terms took effect at the same time as the
Eighteenth Amendment, maintained that the Eighteenth Amendment
had not gone into effect because of the referendums in Washington
and Ohio. judge Rudkin, District judge, held that under Article V
of the federal Constitution only a ratification by state legislatures was
necessary, and that it was not within the power of a state in its
constitution to add to such ratification the requirement of a referendum.
In re the Opinion of the Justices5 the Supreme justices of Maine
made answer to a question of the Governor of the state, that Article
V of the federal Constitution did not permit the ratification of an
amendment to be submitted to a referendum under the state constitution.
The reasoning used to sustain the Ohio and Washington cases is
neither close nor satisfactory. That of Judge Rudkin and the Maine
justices is convincing.
This is a purely federal question, the answer to which state consti-
tutions can not change. Therefore, the fact that the Ohio constitution
specifically requires a referendum to the people on federal Amend-
ments does not affect the question, which is solely one of state power.
If the word "Legislatures" is merely corpus designatum, then there
is no power in those adopting state constitutions to make it otherwise.
Except in the election of members of the House of Representatives,
the federal Constitution nowhere submits any governmental issue
directly to the electors. In the election of President and Senators
the issue was left to a representative body elected by the people. The
Constitution itself was submitted to the people for adoption by conven-
tions in each state elected by the people. Its amendment or revision
was to be submitted to similar representative bodies, to wit, the two
houses of Congress, and to the legislatures of the states. This was,
in the judgment of those who made and ratified the Constitution, a
sufficient submission to the will of the people under the principles of
popular representative government.
Chief justice Marshall, speaking for the Court in McCullough v.
Maryland, says that the Constitution was adopted by the people of
the United States, and not by the states, that
"by the Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the
instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the
only manner in which they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on
such a subject, by assembling in Convention. It is true, they assembled
in their several States-and where else should they have assem-
bled? . . . From these Conventions the Constitution derives its
whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people." 6
In Dodge v. Woolsey Mr. justice Wayne, speaking for the Supreme
Court on the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States over
state constitutions, says:
(1919, Me.) io7 AtI. 673.
(18ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat 316, 403.
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"It is supreme over the people of the United States, a ely and
in their separate sovereig ties, because they have excluded themselves
from any direct or immediate agency in mkn amendments to t
and have directed that amendments should be made representatively
for them, by the congress of the United States, when two thirds of
both Houses shall propose them; or when the legislatures of two thirds
of the several States shall call a convention for proposing amend-
ments, which, in either case, becomes valid, to all intents and purposes,
as a part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three fourths of
them- as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by
Congress."-
When the federal Constitution was adopted, and it is as of that time
we are to reach the meaning of words in the instrument, only eight
state constitutions contained any provision for their amendment at
all, and of these the power was vested with certain restrictions in the
legislatures of three of them, and in the other five it was given to
conventions to be called for the purpose. -ot until i88 was there
any 'provision for amendment of a state constitution by direct
submission to the vote of the people.
That it was the intention to submit the ratification to the popular
representative bodies named, and not to their constituencies, is dearly
shown by the alternative for the state legislatures which under the
Article Congress in its discretion may substitute as the ratifying
agencies. These are conventions in the state called for the purpose.
These are the same kind of representative bodies which adopted the
Constitution and exclude necessarily any idea of further submission to
the people directly of the proposed amendment.
This, too, disposes of the argument adopted by the Vashington
and Ohio courts, that the word "Legislatures" means the law-making
power of the states, for certainly a convention called for the purpose
of ratifying an amendment is not part of the law-making power of
the state.
The unsoundness of this view is further shown by the fact that
nowhere in the actual practice under Article V is proposal or ratifica-
tion of amendments carried on as general legislation must be under
the Constitution. If proposal or ratification were mere law making,
then under section 7, Article I, action of the two Houses of Congress
must be submitted to the President for his approval or disapproval.
Yet in Hollingsworth v. Virginia8 it was held that a proposal by two-
thirds of both Houses was sufficient under the article without submit-
ting it to the President for his approval or disapproval, and this view
has been confirmed by the practice since and by express resolutions
of the Senate.
If ratification by state legislatures under Article V was the-exercise
of general legislative power of the states, then the Governors of the
states must exercise the same power of veto over the resolution of
3 (1798, U S.) 3 Dallas, 378" (188.5, U. S.) 18 HOW-. 331, 348.
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ratification as they do under their respective constitutions over general
legislative acts. Yet the uniform practice since the beginning of the
Government has been not to submit such resolutions to the state
Governors for their action.
The majority opinions in the Washington and Ohio cases place much
reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Davis v. OhioY The constitutional provision there under considera-
tion was Article i, Section 4, as follows:
"The times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators."
The issue there was whether a law of Ohio, passed by the legis-
lature, redistricting the state for Congressmen under a new appor-
tionment by Congress, was subject to a referendum under the state
constitution. The effect of the judgment of the Court was that the
words "prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof" meant
prescribed by the legislative or law-making power of the state, and
therefore that the redistricting law of Ohio passed -by the Legislature
of Ohio, was subject to any general limitation imposed by the state
constitution in enacting laws for the state. The majority opinions in
Ohio and Washington insist that this Article i, Section 4, is in pari
materia with Article V, and the word "Legislature" in the former is
to be given the same meaning as the word "Legislatures" in Article
V. It is impossible to yield to such a conclusion. The function
given to the legislature in Article i, Section 4, is plainly that of making
a law of Ohio just like any other law of the state. The law is to
regulate the congressional -and senatorial elections held in the state,
and differs from other laws only in the circumstance that the power
to make it comes from the federal Constitution, and that Congress
may alter it. The law is to cover the times, places, and manner of
holding such elections. Certainly this is the conferring of a purely
general legislative power upon the state, to be exercised as that power
is exercised under its constitution. Such redistricting laws are sub-
mitted to Governors for the exercise of their power of approval or
disapproval as any other law is. Under Article V, however, the state
legislatures have no discretion to exercise general legislative power.
All they can do is to ratify or reject. They can not amend, qualify
or change. What they exercise is a veto power rather than a legis-
lative power. Theirs is a very limited function. The difference
between the two clauses is so wide that the decision of the federal
Supreme Court is easily distinguished from the case here and has no
bearing upon it.
9 (1916) 24I U. S. 565, 36 Sup. Ct. 7o8. [The view advanced in this article has
been adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the Ohio Referendum Cases,
decided June x, Ig2o. Ed.]
